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INTRODUCTION 
Consistent with the broader theme of the deregulatory era,1 the past 
few decades have seen a growing divide between banking and bankrupt-
cy.2 Through deregulation, banking and financial institutions have been 
increasingly held to different standards than other types of corporations 
in the bankruptcy setting. This divide between banking and financial in-
stitutions on the one hand and all other types of corporations on the other 
essentially excepted banking and financial institutions from the normal 
rules of corporate law and corporate failure.3 That is, finance became 
excused from bankruptcy. 
The divide had long existed, fostered by the unique nature of a class 
of debtors with a large group of government-insured creditor-depositors. 
But the past decades saw the banking community move away from the 
bankruptcy system, and chapter 11 in particular, with a vigor nearing 
revulsion.4 The only way bankers would be involved in bankruptcy was 
as creditors. The collapse of Bear Stearns seems to confirm the special 
place that bankers held in the order. Bear Stearns and its stakeholders 
                                                        
† Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This Article was written 
for the 2011 Adolf A. Berle Jr. Symposium on Corporations, Law & Society at the Seattle Universi-
ty School of Law, and I appreciate the comments I received at the Symposium, as well as the many 
helpful comments I received at the 2011 Seton Hall Faculty Scholarship Retreat. 
 1. I do not use the phrase “deregulatory era” pejoratively. For example, the deregulation of the 
railroads under the 1980 Staggers Act was arguably a good thing given their financial condition 
under regulation. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). 
 2. I conceive of this era as extending from at least the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, 
which deregulated the railroads, through 2010, which saw both the passage of healthcare regulation 
and the recent financial reform legislation. Although I trace the real growth of the divide to the dere-
gulatory era, I agree with David Skeel that the roots of the division trace back to at least the 1930s 
and the decision to exclude Wall Street from most corporate restructurings. David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 1 (2009). 
 3. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregula-
tion and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1333 (2009). 
 4. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk & Chapter 11, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 433 
(2009); see also David Hahn, The Financial Crisis of 2009—Have Reorganization Proceedings in 
Emerging Markets Gone Bankrupt? Israel as a Case Study, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 731, 760 (2010). 
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were not subjected to the same fate as mundane insolvent companies, 
with bondholders and, even more importantly, shareholders receiving a 
buyout on claims that were likely worthless. 
And then Lehman. Bankers faced the cold reality that the growth of 
“shadow banking” had moved finance out of the comfortable realm of 
the OCC, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve.5 The government rescue of 
AIG can be seen as a desperate attempt to regain control.6 The subse-
quent treatment of Citibank and Merrill Lynch, contrasted with the 
treatment of Lehman, reaffirms this interpretation. 
The Dodd-Frank Act formalizes this attempt to restore the old or-
der.7 Under the Act, all large bank holding companies will be subject to a 
new resolution regime—essentially a glorified receivership process—
controlled by the FDIC and initiated by the Treasury Secretary and the 
Federal Reserve. The new system will cover the large banks as well as 
the former investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs, and many other 
important institutions with more than 85% of their activities in 
“finance.”8 
But by developing a new system for addressing financial distress, 
instead of integrating the new system into the existing structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the financial reform act simply recreates the prior 
problem in a new place while also creating new problems. The future 
Lehmans and AIGs will be covered by the new procedure, but other 
firms that have 84% of their activities in finance will not. In short, the 
disconnect between bankruptcy and banking has moved to a different 
group of firms. And we may have done nothing but protect ourselves 
against an exact repeat of the financial crisis.9 
This change will reduce the overall risks to the financial system to 
the extent that the size of Lehman, AIG, Bear Sterns, and others was the 
key problem in the recent financial crisis. But if instead the problem was 
                                                        
 5. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Con-
glomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009). 
 6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce 
Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg44.aspx; William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 
967 (2009). 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 8. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a company is “predominantly engaged in financial activities” if 
(1) the annual gross revenues of the company and all of its subsidiaries from activities that are finan-
cial in nature (as defined in § 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act) represent 85% or more of the 
company’s consolidated annual gross revenues, or (2) the consolidated assets of the company and all 
of its subsidiaries related to activities that are financial in nature (as defined in § 4(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act) represent 85% or more of the company’s consolidated assets. 
 9. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2010) (discussing the reactive nature of most financial regulation). 
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the interconnected nature of these firms, the difference between 84% and 
85% is unimportant.10 
And in focusing on the biggest of the big, the recent financial 
reform bill has left behind the banking industry’s detritus in the bank-
ruptcy system.11 For example, derivatives will now get special treatment 
in bankruptcy only in those cases where it is least needed to protect the 
banking industry, even though these provisions were originally justified 
based on their application to the financial system.12 
Expecting that the financial reform bill is not the last piece of legis-
lation in this area, I explore the divide between banking or finance and 
bankruptcy.13 As with any other industry, bankruptcy is of limited import 
to the financial industry in normal times, save for its role in general deb-
tor–creditor law. But even here, bankruptcy rules are a vital part of every 
financing contract, operating to make claims consistent across similarly 
situated creditors and discouraging runs on the assets of the firm. 
In times of general financial stress, the content of these rules and 
their strength becomes ever more vital. And if the rules are unclear or 
their application uncertain, the risk to the financial system becomes acute. 
This is especially true in the financial industry, where the horizontal con-
nections between firms go far beyond those found in any other industry. 
In this Article, I argue that there are significant gaps in the federal 
system for resolving financial distress in a financial firm even after pas-
sage of the Dodd-Frank bill. These gaps represent potential sources of 
systemic risk—that is, risk to the financial system as a whole. They must 
be fixed. 
                                                        
 10. Dodd-Frank Act § 201(b). 
 11. See Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives Still Special After Overhaul, DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/derivatives-still-special-after-overhaul. 
 12. Under Dodd-Frank, banks will have to spin off (into their broker-dealer affiliates) their 
trading in equity swaps, commodity swaps, energy swaps, CDS on non-investment-grade reference 
entities, and uncleared CDS on investment-grade reference entities. Dodd-Frank Act §716. These 
disfavored contracts will continue to be subject to special treatment in bankruptcy, including the 
bankruptcy cases of nonfinancial firms, where the justifications for special treatment are implausible. 
See Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009). Moreover, many of these disfavored derivatives are the types of contracts 
that can be used to give “normal” supply contracts special treatment under the Code. See generally 
In re MBS Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 432 B.R. 570 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2010). 
 13. This expectation finds support in the myriad studies of bankruptcy and financial institutions 
that are mandated under the Dodd-Frank Act. See Stephen Lubben, The Code and the New Financial 
Reform Act, CREDIT SLIPS (July 22, 2010), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/07/the-code- 
and-the-new-financial-reform-act.html. 
1262 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1259 
But I should make clear at the outset that I do not argue that these 
gaps must be filled with the Bankruptcy Code.14 Rather, the point is that 
the various systems for resolving financial distress among financial firms 
must be integrated so that the result of financial distress is clear and pre-
dictable. Integrating all under the Bankruptcy Code is an option, but not 
the only way to achieve such clarity. 
The first Part of this Article sketches the several existing systems 
for resolving financial distress in financial firms, including the new reso-
lution authority15 created by the Dodd-Frank Act. By my count, there are 
at least six systems at work here, not counting state-by-state variations. 
Part II examines the coverage of these systems and the uncertainty 
created by the interaction of the same. For example, under current law, a 
large hedge fund might be “resolved” under chapter 11 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, or it might not be. The decision rests with the systemic risk 
counsel. Therefore, the fund’s counterparties will be unable to determine 
ahead of time which set of rules is incorporated into their contracts with 
the hedge fund. Undoubtedly, both will be priced with a further discount 
for the uncertainty. That is unlikely to be the optimal solution. 
Part III of the Article then considers the ways in which the divide 
between finance and bankruptcy could be narrowed, if not eliminated. 
Ultimately, I doubt the plausibility of solving these issues with some 
grand solution like drafting a unified bankruptcy law. The political reali-
ties involved in getting a major piece of legislation through Congress are 
so daunting nowadays that it is something of a wonder that even Dodd-
Frank, with all its limitations, passed. A unified system of financial dis-
tress, which would implicate both state and federal interests, seems al-
most more unlikely. Given this reality, I suggest incremental ways to 
move the myriad existing systems together. These suggestions exploit the 
new Financial Stability Oversight Counsel’s power to recommend 
changes in regulation to fill gaps left by the Dodd-Frank Act.16 
It is important throughout to maintain a realistic approach; blind 
regulation will more often than not simply encourage new innovation, 
often in ways that are apt to be even more inefficient, less transparent, or 
both. But only by overcoming the divide between banking and bankrupt-
cy will the systemic risks presented by the existing patchwork be ameli-
                                                        
 14. For the argument that the Bankruptcy Code should be expanded to fill such gaps, see gen-
erally Samuel L. Bufford, Increasing Scope of Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 500 
(1996). 
 15. See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 99 (2010) (“Resolution au-
thority is the polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either shutting them down or 
selling them off for the best possible price.”). 
 16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 120, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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orated. Ultimately, this is a matter that will require coordination between 
the alienated worlds of banking and bankruptcy. 
I. RESOLUTION REGIMES 
Historically, the United States has taken an inconsistent approach to 
the division between banking and bankruptcy, in part reflecting vague 
notions that banks were unlike other businesses, and also reflecting the 
tension between those who argued for local creation of banks and those, 
lead initially by Alexander Hamilton, who favored integration of the na-
tional economy at the federal level. For example, the 1841 Bankruptcy 
Act17 applied to bankers and those who underwrote insurance policies.18 
But while the statute initially included banks—the entity as opposed to 
the individual—and all other corporations among those who could file 
bankruptcy, the provision was removed on “states’ rights” grounds be-
fore the Act received final approval.19 The 1867 Bankruptcy Act20 split 
the difference; federally chartered banks could not file under the Act, 
while state-chartered banks and insurance companies could and did.21 
By the time of the first permanent American bankruptcy law in 
1898,22 it was widely accepted that banks and insurance companies were 
sufficiently different from other companies that they should be excluded 
from the normal bankruptcy process.23 Of course, most big business was 
excluded from the Bankruptcy Act,24 so the exclusion of financial com-
panies was consistent with the broader tendency to specialize the law of 
large enterprise.25 
                                                        
 17. An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, ch. 9, 5 
Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by an act to repeal the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843). 
 18. SAMUEL OWEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY 11–12 (1842). 
 19. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 136–37, 140–42 (1919); CHARLES 
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 66–67 (1935). Implicit in the states’ rights 
argument was a fear that northern banks would be the only banks left standing if western and south-
ern institutions were subject to bankruptcy petitions. Id. 
 20. An act to establish a uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States, ch. 176, 
14 Stat. 517 (1867). 
 21. See EDWIN JAMES, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 261–62 (1867). 
 22. An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, ch. 541, 
30 Stat. 544 (1898). 
 23. It is often asserted that the United States is unique in this regard, but that does not appear to 
be true. See, e.g., Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Bank Bankruptcy in Canada: A Comparative Perspective, 25 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 59, 64–65 (2009). 
 24. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (2004). 
 25. It is important to note that this was the era before FDIC insurance or the Glass-Steagall 
Act’s separation of banking functions, so that bankers often engaged in activities that we would now 
ascribe to broker-dealers or investment banks. This was especially true during the Gilded Age, when 
the growth of large railroads led to a concomitant growth of high finance. See generally THE 
RAILROADS: THE NATION’S FIRST BIG BUSINESS (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ed., 1981). 
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More recently, the key bankruptcy mechanism for dealing with 
large corporations is chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the 
United States has a number of different specialized insolvency regimes, 
including the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (FDIA) provisions 
that apply to banking organizations and the Securities Investor Protection 
Act (SIPA) provisions that apply to broker-dealers.26 
Furthermore, insurance regulation is entirely exempted from federal 
regulation. This exemption resulted from the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945, which was Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n. 27  Thus, insurance 
company insolvencies are a matter of state law by virtue of the combined 
effects of McCarran-Ferguson and an express exemption from the Bank-
ruptcy Code.28 
* * * 
Chapter 11 is probably the best known of these various insolvency 
systems. State corporate law sets the rules for how a corporation or other 
entity initiates a chapter 11 proceeding. Thereafter, the process is entirely 
federal, taking place under the oversight of a federal bankruptcy court. 
The debtor’s board retains ultimate control over the process as “debtor in 
possession,” and the process works toward a reorganization plan. Credi-
tors have a right to vote on the plan unless they are being paid in full or 
not paid at all, and the plan can provide for either the liquidation or reca-
pitalization of the debtor.29 While the statute itself does not express any 
particular congressional aim, the main goal is understood to be the max-
imization of the debtor’s value in a way that is not possible in either a 
piecemeal or quick liquidation.30 
Save for when the Dodd-Frank Act’s new resolution authority ap-
plies, chapter 11 remains the primary instrument for resolving financial 
institutions. Unless a specialized regime is in place, such as those for 
banks or insurance companies, chapter 11 will apply. 31  Thus, hedge 
funds, private equity funds, and investment banks, as well as parent 
                                                        
 26. And the Commodities Exchange Act provisions that apply to futures commission mer-
chants, but I do not address these in this Article. 
 27. 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding the Sherman Act could apply to state-chartered insurance 
companies). 
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2010). The exemption may be important, given that the Bankruptcy 
Code is enacted under express constitutional authority, and thus might trump the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. See William Goddard, In Between the Trenches: The Jurisdictional Conflict Between 
a Bankruptcy Court and a State Insurance Receivership Court, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 567, 574 (2003). 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006). 
 30. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2010). 
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companies of banks and insurance companies, will all face resolution 
under chapter 11 unless the entity in question can be resolved under the 
new resolution authority and the Secretary of the Treasury decides to 
invoke the authority32 as described below. 
The closest procedure to chapter 11 is the resolution of broker-
dealers under SIPA.33 SIPA specifically provides for the application of 
chapters 1, 3, and 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to the extent such provisions are not inconsistent with 
SIPA.34 Thus, both chapter 11 and SIPA proceedings draw on the same 
general parts of the Bankruptcy Code to resolve claims and define the 
basic elements of the process.35 But SIPA is strictly a liquidation proce-
dure, which makes its outcome both more certain and less flexible than a 
chapter 11 case. 
SIPA proceedings are typically commenced in district court and 
then removed to the local bankruptcy court.36 A trustee is appointed and 
directed to distribute securities to customers to the greatest extent prac-
ticable in satisfaction of their claims against the debtor.37 Through such 
distributions, the customers of a broker-dealer receive a priority over 
other general unsecured creditors who have to await a more bankruptcy-
like distribution, if there are any assets to make such a distribution.38 
Bank resolution proceedings similarly involve a favored class of 
creditors, but take place in a completely nonjudicial forum.39 Since the 
creation of deposit insurance in the New Deal, the FDIC has been the 
receiver for national banks and, increasingly, state-chartered institu-
tions.40 The FDIC operates under an overriding mandate to reduce the 
cost of insolvency to the FDIC insurance fund.41 Moreover, the National 
Depositor Preference statute gives payment priority to depositors in all 
                                                        
 32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 33. See generally Daniel J. Morse, When a Securities Brokerage Firm Goes Broke: A Primer 
on the Securities Investment Protection Act of 1970, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34 (2006). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2006). 
 35. SIPA itself is only applicable to broker-dealers required to register under the 1934 Ex-
change Act, leaving small, intrastate broker-dealers and certain foreign broker-dealers subject to 
certain specialized provisions of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. By all accounts, these exceptions 
are a small minority of broker-dealers. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4) (2010); see also Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-1(b)(1), -2(b) (2006). 
 38. Id. § 78fff-3(a) (2010). 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (2010). 
 40. Id. § 1811 (2006). 
 41. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2010); 12 C.F.R. § 360.1 (2010). There is also a prohibition on bene-
fiting other creditors, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E), or the bank’s shareholders (i.e., the parent holding 
company), id. § 1821(a)(4)(B). 
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insolvency proceedings, and states that the FDIC may assert their rights 
as subrogee when depositors have been paid from the insurance fund.42 
In most cases, the preference statute has the effect of eliminating any 
recovery for unsecured creditors and shareholders, as the largest propor-
tion of claims against a failed institution typically are those of insured 
depositors.43 
Under the FDIA, the FDIC, acting as receiver or conservator, suc-
ceeds to the rights of the institution and proceeds to marshal its assets.44 
Shareholders and managers cease to have operational control of the 
bank.45 As receiver, the FDIC can liquidate the institution, organize a 
new bank or a temporary bridge bank, take over some or all of the assets 
and liabilities of the failed institution, or arrange a merger or purchase of 
assets and assumption of liabilities.46 
The bridge bank process is not unlike the 363 sale process used in 
the recent automotive chapter 11 cases, but all FDIC receivership pro-
ceedings are under the sole control of the FDIC, with the role of the 
courts strictly constrained.47 Moreover, the bank receivership process is 
initiated by a regulator or chartering authority—either state or federal—
and the concept of a “voluntary” receivership is little more than a theo-
retical possibility.48 In short, a bank receivership is a much more “inter-
nal” process as compared with a chapter 11 case, which must play out in 
the public forum of a federal bankruptcy court. 
In this respect, an insurance company resolution is more like the 
other nonbank systems that have been discussed to this point. Although 
there are state-by-state variations, in general, a distressed insurance com-
pany is placed in receivership after a petition from the home-state insur-
ance regulator.49 The presiding judge will typically issue injunctions or 
stays to prevent the dismemberment of the company during its resolution, 
although the enforcement of these stays is sometimes complicated by the 
more limited jurisdiction of a state court as compared with a federal dis-
trict or bankruptcy court.50 
As with banks, appointment of a receiver suspends the powers of 
management and places the control of the company in the hands of the 
                                                        
 42. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (2010); Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and 
Bank Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 161–62 (2007). 
 43. Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1018–20 (2010). 
 44. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c), (d)(13)(E) (2010). 
 45. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(A). 
 46. Id. §§ 1821(d), (n). 
 47. Id. § 1821(j). 
 48. Id. § 1821(c)(10). 
 49. E.g., N.Y. INS. L. §§ 7403, 7417 (McKinney 2000). 
 50. E.g., id. § 7419. 
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receiver.51 Claims are fixed as of the date of the appointment. An insur-
er’s policies are typically deemed cancelled on appointment of a receiv-
er.52 The estate is not liable for future losses, but policyholders have va-
lid claims for losses incurred to that point. In many cases, the policy-
holders will also have claims for breach of contract against the estate. 
The receiver may be responsible for either conducting the insurer’s busi-
ness with an eye towards rehabilitation or for conserving and protecting 
the insurer’s assets for the ultimate end of liquidation. Ultimately, the 
state insurance regulator, as receiver, has a good deal of discretion, not 
unlike the FDIC acting in bank insolvency proceedings. 
* * * 
Until relatively recently, this fragmentation of insolvency law typi-
cally meant that a large financial institution would be subjected to chap-
ter 11 plus one specialized regime when it failed.53 For example, a large 
banking institution would have its insured subsidiaries resolved under an 
FDIC process while the holding company filed a chapter 11 petition. The 
Washington Mutual holding company filed under chapter 11 in Septem-
ber 2008, one day after the bank subsidiary was taken over by the 
FDIC.54 
This dual-process arrangement is unlikely to result in optimization 
of the troubled company’s assets because the specialized procedures fa-
vor speed and a protected class of creditor, not the maximization of the 
overall value of the company. The FDIC has little incentive to maximize 
the value of the chapter 11 debtor’s key asset—the bank subsidiary—
once there is enough value to clear the costs of administration and the 
claims of depositors. Similarly, since most insurance regulators can 
avoid the insurance company’s future claims by simply canceling them, 
there is little need to preserve the going concern value of what may be 
the holding company debtor’s key asset. A simple liquidation will often 
suffice. The specialized procedures undoubtedly benefit the protected 
creditors, but perhaps at the expense of overall welfare. 
Any inefficiency that existed in the system in the twentieth century 
was undoubtedly amplified by the effective repeal of Glass-Steagal in 
                                                        
 51. E.g., id. § 7409. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Transit Cas. Co., 588 N.E.2d 38, 41 (N.Y. 1992). 
 53. See In re New Times Sec. Serv., Inc., 371 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2004); see also In re Home 
Holdings, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 5690, 2001 WL 262750, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001) (chapter 11 case 
of holding company for “its wholly owned subsidiary, Home Insurance, a New Hampshire property 
and casualty insurance company.”). The author represented the foregoing debtor while in practice. 
See generally, Laura S. McAlister, The Inefficiencies of Exclusion: The Importance of Including 
Insurance Companies in the Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 129 (2008). 
 54. In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 408 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
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1999 and the subsequent creation of a kind of “universal banking” model 
in the United States.55 Where once a financial institution might implicate 
two insolvency systems, new entities like Citibank, Bank of America, 
and JPMorgan-Chase would trigger three or four insolvency procedures 
within the United States alone if they faced insolvency.56 Given the com-
peting goals of these procedures, creating a single forum for resolving a 
financial institution seemed like a natural goal of the Dodd-Frank legisla-
tion. But it was only partially achieved. 
The resolution authority established by the Dodd-Frank Act is ap-
parently meant to address two goals: the elimination of taxpayer bailouts 
and the end of “too big to fail.” Both are said to come from the inadequa-
cies of current insolvency law, particularly chapter 11 and its inability to 
deal with a systemic crisis.57 
The new law partially supersedes chapter 11 as applied to financial 
companies, granting the Treasury Secretary the authority to appoint the 
FDIC as receiver of a systemically important financial company, with 
certain important limitations that will be discussed in Part II.58 
To understand Dodd-Frank, one has to abandon any hopes that the 
Act will show internal consistency. In particular, the categories of firms 
that are subjected to heightened regulation because of their perceived 
systemic importance have but a loose relationship to the categories of 
firms that are subject to the new resolution authority. For example, only 
bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets can be re-
gulated as systemically important, while any bank holding company can 
be placed into resolution authority.59 
In general, a financial institution is subject to the new resolution au-
thority in two instances. First, bank holding companies, as defined in 
§ 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act,60 are automatically subject to 
the new resolution authority.61 In addition, if the new systemic risk over-
                                                        
 55. Section 101 of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 amended the Banking Act of 1933, com-
monly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, by repealing § 20, which prohibited any Federal Reserve 
member bank from affiliating with an entity engaged in securities activities. The same section of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also repealed § 32 of Glass-Steagall, which prohibited interlocking man-
agement between a member bank and any securities firm. 
 56. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
 57. See generally FDIC Chair Describes New Resolution Authority, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 
2010, at 10 (2010). 
 58. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 59. Compare id. § 165, with id. §§ 201(a)(11), 203(b). 
 60. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2010). 
 61. Dodd-Frank Act § 201(a)(11). The “Hotel California” provision in Dodd-Frank requires 
any bank holding company with $50 billion or more in assets as of January 1, 2010, that received 
assistance or participated in the capital purchase program under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
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sight panel determines that a company is primarily engaged in financial 
activities, then the company can be subjected to the new resolution au-
thority.62  Companies previously deemed “systemically important non-
bank financial institutions” and subjected to heightened regulation are 
automatically included in this second category—no additional determina-
tion is required.63 
Also included are subsidiaries of the two foregoing categories of fi-
nancial companies, excluding subsidiaries that are insured depository 
institutions or insurance companies.64 In addition, the Act purports to 
include broker-dealers that are members of the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corporation (SIPC), but, as discussed in Part II, the significance 
of this inclusion is unclear given other provisions of the Act. And insur-
ance companies cannot be placed into receivership under the Act.65 
For purposes of determining whether a company is predominantly 
engaged in financial activities, the Act establishes an 85% test. Under the 
test, 85% of the total consolidated revenues of the company must come 
from activities the oversight panel deems financial in nature, or more 
than 85% of the firm’s consolidated assets must be financial in nature.66 
This same 85% requirement applies to a determination that a nonbank 
financial institution is systemically important, and thus subject to heigh-
tened regulation and automatic eligibility for the resolution authority.67 
Upon a determination by the appropriate federal regulators that the 
financial company is in default or in danger of default, a financial com-
pany may become subject to FDIC receivership, which is modeled on the 
FDIC’s traditional bank receiverships.68 Chapter 11, or another relevant 
insolvency procedure, remains the default,69 but the new resolution au-
thority largely trumps that procedure when activated.70 
The Treasury Secretary, consulting with the President, will decide 
to invoke the resolution procedure upon a two-thirds vote of both the 
Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC Board or the SEC. The Secretary’s 
decision is subject to limited, confidential review by the D.C. District 
Court, a tribunal not known for its extensive experience with insolvency 
                                                                                                                            
to be treated as a systemically important nonbank financial institution, and thus subject to the resolu-
tion authority, even if it subsequently ceases to be a bank holding company. Id. § 117. 
 62. Dodd-Frank Act §117. 
 63. This heightened regulation includes risk-based capital and liquidity requirements, leverage 
limits, concentration limits, and resolution plan requirements. Id. § 165. 
 64. Id. § 201(a)(11)(iv). 
 65. Id. § 203(e). 
 66. Id. § 201(b). 
 67. Id. § 102(a)(6). 
 68. Id. § 203. 
 69. Id. § 203(a)(2)(F). 
 70. Id. § 208. 
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law.71 And even this review will not happen if the firm’s board consents 
to the resolution process; one can expect that future boards will be sub-
ject to extreme pressure in this regard.72 
The FDIC’s resolution powers allow it to transfer all or any portion 
of the assets or liabilities of the financial company to a third party.73 If a 
third-party buyer cannot be found, the FDIC has the authority to establish 
a temporary bridge financial company. The bridge company will hold 
any part of the business worth preserving until it can be sold to a third 
party at fair value or otherwise liquidated in an orderly fashion.74 
The FDIC is given near unilateral authority to review claims and ei-
ther allow or disallow them.75 Any challenge to the claims resolution 
process must be filed in the district court where the financial company is 
located, a court that is not likely to have any knowledge or special inter-
est in the resolution process. 
The Act provides that the FDIC can incur interim debt obligations 
to fund a liquidation that can later be recovered through assessments on 
the financial sector. The Act prevents the use of taxpayer funds to pay for 
the receivership process, although the Treasury clearly faces some risks 
that it will ultimately bear the cost if financial institutions are unable to 
pay the FDIC’s ex post assessments.76 That is, while the statute can say 
taxpayers shall incur no losses, that does not necessarily make it so. 
And remember this new system only applies with certainty to bank 
holding companies. For other financial companies, the resolution authori-
ty is an alternative to the joint implementation of chapter 11 and the var-
ious specialized insolvency systems. The implications of this and other 
potential gaps in the overall insolvency system are explored in the next 
Part of this Article. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE NEW ORDER 
Following Dodd-Frank, a distressed bank holding company and its 
bank subsidiary will now be addressed in a single forum. Maybe. 
Maybe, because the new resolution authority is a process that must 
be invoked by regulators, and thus might be subject to delay or even neg-
lect if the regulators disdain the new procedures. 
Delayed assertion of the new resolution authority may present a 
bigger problem than no assertion of the authority because it has the po-
                                                        
 71. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
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 74. Id. § 210(h). 
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tential to create greater uncertainty. Dodd-Frank expressly provides that 
a subsequently commenced FDIC resolution proceeding can displace the 
bankruptcy court already hearing a chapter 11 case regarding the same 
company.77 Not only will this create uncertainty for the players in the 
chapter 11 case, but there is also some risk of forum shopping. The gov-
ernment may find it convenient to bring a quick end to a chapter 11 case 
that has not gone in its favor. 
And the FDIC’s many roles in even the simplest cases present some 
problems. While in bank resolution the FDIC is sometimes considered 
the “residual claimant,” and thus properly in charge of the proceedings, 
they are really better analogized to a senior lender who has little incen-
tive to maximize the bank’s asset value once that value clears the claims 
of priority deposit holders.78 More realistically, if we assume that a failed 
bank resolution carries some risk for the FDIC, the agency will have in-
centives to simply get the process over as soon as possible. This may 
result in the sale of bank assets at below value to subsidize and thus en-
courage a prospective purchaser. All of this has serious consequences for 
the resolution of the holding company where its equity stake in the bank 
may be sacrificed to promote FDIC’s other interests. 
More broadly, there is a problem with the coverage of the new reso-
lution authority. As noted, the resolution authority automatically applies 
to bank holding companies—a group that now includes the major in-
vestment banks.79 But after that, coverage becomes vague. 
The other big group of firms subject to the resolution authority are 
those that get more than 85% of their revenues from finance activities. 
For some companies, namely those who are purely financial firms, it will 
be obvious that resolution authority might apply. But whether it will still 
remains uncertain. 
For a small to mid-size hedge fund, whether the resolution authority 
applies or not might be context sensitive. In normal times, regulators 
might be willing to let the fund enter chapter 11, but in an economy like 
that experienced in late 2008 and early 2009, the answer might be quite 
different.80 Presumably, the fund’s stakeholders will have to price this 
uncertainty when dealing with the fund. 
                                                        
 77. Id. § 208. 
 78. Hynes & Walt, supra note 43. 
 79. See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks 
the End of an Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/ 
22bank.html. 
 80. See generally Nicole M. Boyson et al., Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks, 65 J. 
FIN. 1789 (2010). 
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For other firms, the question of whether they are above or below 
the 85% mark may change from quarter to quarter. For a firm near the 
margin, the answer could vary with each new accounting statement. 
In some cases, it may make sense to acquire a somewhat related 
nonfinancial business. Whatever inefficiencies this presents might be 
offset by lowering the cost of funding if creditors do indeed value cer-
tainty about how financial distress in the firm will be addressed. Com-
mitting to the transparency of a chapter 11 process, compared with the 
closed FDIC liquidation system, might have real value. For all the com-
plaints about the automotive chapter 11 cases, the bankruptcy court hear-
ings in those cases provide a degree of transparency totally lacking in 
AIG, Bearn Sterns, or Washington Mutual.81 
The foregoing raises the important connection between firm struc-
ture manipulation and the new resolution authority, especially for non-
bank financial firms. As drafted, the Dodd-Frank Act appears to allow 
regulators to move down a firm’s organizational chart but not up. In par-
ticular, the new resolution authority is applicable if the firm in question 
and all of its subsidiaries derive either 85% of their annual gross reve-
nues or 85% of their consolidated assets from activities that are “finan-
cial in nature” or incidental to a financial activity, or from the ownership 
or control of one or more insured depository institutions.82 The Act also 
allows for the inclusion of subsidiaries in a resolution proceeding.83 Thus, 
there are some temptations to fragment the financial activities of a firm 
and place them under nonfinancial activities in a company’s organiza-
tional chart, making it difficult for regulators to find any connected group 
of companies that are 85% engaged in finance. 
Congress apparently gave regulators only indirect means of ad-
dressing this kind of manipulation. Namely, the systemic risk regulation 
provision of Dodd-Frank allows regulators to vote to regulate a company 
that it believes is attempting to evade regulation.84 This designation could 
arguably be used to get the firm in question into the resolution authority, 
which itself has no anti-evasion rules. Obviously, the regulators would 
need to exhibit some dexterity if this approach were to be invoked on the 
                                                        
 81. Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, New Details Emerge About Morgan Stanley and Citi in the 
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eve of a financial collapse at the financial institution, especially given a 
firm’s right to contest its designation as systemically important.85 
* * * 
These big picture issues will work in conjunction with some inten-
tional gaps embedded in the new resolution authority. For instance, when 
an SIPC member, such as a broker-dealer, qualifies for the new resolu-
tion authority, the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly provides for the continued 
application of SIPA proceedings.86  As with many rules under Dodd-
Frank, there are some notable and sometimes puzzling modifications. 
First, the FDIC, as receiver of a covered broker or dealer, is to ap-
point SIPC as trustee for the liquidation of the covered broker or dealer.87 
This contrasts with the normal practice of an SIPC appointing a private 
attorney as trustee.88 Note also that the appointment of SIPC as trustee 
happens without court involvement. In addition, SIPC, as trustee, shall 
have all powers and duties provided under SIPA and shall conduct the 
liquidation of the covered broker or dealer in accordance with the terms 
of SIPA, except that SIPC shall have no powers or duties with respect to 
assets and liabilities transferred by the FDIC from the covered broker or 
dealer to a bridge company. SIPA is in charge except when it isn’t. 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that customer net equity claims be 
discharged and satisfied as if the FDIC had never been appointed receiv-
er of the broker or dealer.89 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that 
the FDIC shall satisfy customer claims to the extent that a customer 
would have received more securities or cash had the covered financial 
company been subject to an SIPA proceeding without the appointment of 
the FDIC as receiver. SIPC, as trustee, is to allocate customer property 
and distribute customer name securities in accordance with § 78fff-2(c) 
of SIPA, but all other claims are to be paid in accordance with the priori-
ties under § 210(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.90 Essentially, customers still 
get SIPA-like treatment, but all other creditors are subject to Dodd-
Frank’s distribution scheme. 
In short, broker-dealers will be half in and half out of the new reso-
lution procedure. 
                                                        
 85. Id. § 113(e). 
 86. Id. § 205. 
 87. Id. § 205(a)(1). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (2010). 
 89. Dodd-Frank Act § 205(f). 
 90. Id. § 205(g). 
1274 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1259 
Similar problems arise with regard to insurance companies, which 
are largely excluded from the new resolution authority.91 The only power 
the FDIC obtains under Dodd-Frank is the ability to initiate a state court 
receivership if the state regulator fails to act. 
Thus, the insurance company piece of a large financial company 
will be largely unaffected by the enactment of Dodd-Frank, while the 
parent company will be subject to the new resolution procedure. Given 
the realities of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,92 this aspect of Dodd-Frank 
will be especially difficult to address as explained in the next Part of this 
Article. 
* * * 
Overall, this analysis has shown two broad types of gaps in the 
overall insolvency structure. First, there is the uncertainty element 
created by overlaying a new procedure without having it entirely displace 
the prior structure. The Dodd-Frank FDIC structure might apply, but 
debtor firms have no ability to invoke the process themselves. With the 
decision to apply the new procedure left to the regulators, one procedure 
(chapter 11) may commence only to be supplanted by another (resolution 
authority) in an ad hoc manner. 
Dodd-Frank also creates uncertainty by the use of a bright-line 85% 
rule. The use of such a rule recognizes the reality of “shadow banking,” 
the expansion of banking from traditional banks to other related areas, 
like money market funds, securitization, and private investment funds. 
Simply creating a resolution procedure for “banks” and bank holding 
companies would clearly fall short. But if the new resolution authority is 
designed to address perceived inadequacies with chapter 11, why is 
chapter 11 adequate for a firm that derives 84% of its revenue from 
finance? 
In short, there is uncertainty across two planes: will the regulators 
invoke the procedure, and does the procedure even apply to the firm in 
question? 
Consider a large money market mutual fund. If a run on the assets 
of the fund began, would the new resolution procedure be invoked? The 
fund likely meets the 85% test—more than 85% of its assets will be 
finance related. But is this fund important enough for the Secretary and 
the Systemic Risk Counsel to invoke resolution authority? Individually, 
maybe not, but if the run on this fund might prompt runs on other funds, 
the outcome becomes less certain. This uncertainty over how the gov-
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ernment will respond to a crisis was allegedly solved by the new resolu-
tion authority, but in this case it seems quite unclear. 
The second area in which gaps have been identified turns on the 
coverage of the new resolution authority. If the goal was to resolve a 
large financial firm in a single procedure, Dodd-Frank clearly failed. 
Given the international component of finance, it was unlikely to be fully 
successful. But as noted, even domestically large financial firms will 
continue to be subject to a variety of processes, especially with regard to 
broker-dealers and insurance companies. 
There is also the question of whether the 85% rule can be manipu-
lated to create gaps in the coverage of the new resolution authority. What 
if Apple decided to run what amounted to a technology-focused hedge 
fund out of an unincorporated division of the parent company? Enron 
reminds us that the example might not be totally implausible as we saw a 
“normal” energy company transformed into an energy trading firm see-
mingly overnight. 
III. GOING FORWARD 
Given that the new structure is subject to manipulation and creates 
uncertainty, both in terms of how the new system will work and which 
system will apply, there is obviously some room for improvement. But it 
seems unlikely that any such improvement will take the form of major 
legislative enactments. Thus, this Part focuses on the changes that can be 
made under existing law. 
First, since the 85% rule in the resolution authority context is clear-
ly subject to some manipulation, regulators will have to use their authori-
ty to combat such manipulation in the systemic risk context to also ad-
dress manipulation in the resolution context. Namely, extra vigilance will 
be required on the systemic risk side to ensure that the new resolution 
authority remains available to regulators when and as appropriate. Only 
if a company has been made subject to systemic oversight will a firm 
with less than 85% of its activities in finance qualify for resolution. 
Even if manipulation is put to one side, the uncertainty surrounding 
which resolution procedure will apply remains. Some of this is exacer-
bated by the fact that, while the FDIC will be in charge of the resolution 
process once initiated, it has limited authority over the commencement of 
the process. The key player in initiation is the Treasury Secretary, an in-
herently political actor who is unlikely to be able to make commitments 
that will last beyond any particular Secretary’s term in office. Thus, 
while a Secretary might commit to only using the resolution authority in 
times of systemic financial crisis, leaving chapter 11 and the other spe-
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cialized regimes dominant in most instances, this commitment is of li-
mited value. 
The Federal Reserve Board might make such a commitment, using 
its power to authorize the Treasury Secretary to block a resolution pro-
ceeding except in specified instances. Ultimately, however, the amusing-
ly complex mechanism for instituting a resolution proceeding—requiring 
the consent of the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury Secretary 
simultaneously—suggests that resolution proceedings will only be insti-
tuted when the entire financial-regulatory community is in agreement. In 
such instances, a prior commitment might be of little value. 
Nonetheless, there could be some value in all of these regulators de-
fining when they believe it would be appropriate to invoke the resolution 
authority. Creditors will still have to price two insolvency systems for 
most financial firms, but at least such a statement will provide some in-
sight into the relative probabilities of each system’s use. 
The Federal Reserve can bolster a credible commitment to use 
chapter 11 and the other specialized insolvency systems through its pow-
er to require systemically important institutions to file resolution plans.93 
If these plans set forth a convincing scheme for resolving the company 
under chapter 11, other indications that the Dodd-Frank resolution au-
thority will be used only as a last resort will be more credible. The pre-
packaged CIT bankruptcy case offers one model for how such a plan 
might work, although it should be conceded that CIT, however large, was 
substantially smaller than many of the systemically important institutions 
in this country.94 The key will be to require a good deal of specificity in 
such plans along with the input of reorganization professionals. In short, 
the banking lawyers will have to talk to the bankruptcy lawyers. 
Moreover, the plans must be continually updated to ensure their re-
levance. A plan done once and filed away in a drawer obviously ignores 
the dynamic nature of the financial industry. 
Minimizing the differences between the Dodd-Frank resolution 
process and the other insolvency systems can also reduce the uncertainty 
over which insolvency system will be invoked. Thus, rather than creating 
new rules for the resolution process, the comparable rules should be in-
corporated from the Bankruptcy Code or other relevant insolvency 
process. The consequences of rejecting a contract, for example, should 
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be the same regardless of the procedure used, unless there is a good rea-
son for some deviation. 
Similarly, the FDIC could use its rulemaking authority95 to commit 
to following a financial institution’s resolution plan even if that plan con-
templated resolution under chapter 11. For example, if the plan calls for a 
quick sale of key assets under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the FDIC 
could also commit to move the same assets into a bridge institution upon 
commencement of the resolution process. Thus, the basic outcome would 
be harmonized across the various possible resolution procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
All of this is feasible, and can narrow the gap between resolution 
processes. But is it likely? And what risks remain? 
On the question of the probability of these changes happening, one 
has to be somewhat skeptical. Up to this point, the FDIC has shown little 
interest in engaging with the restructuring community and has moved to 
implement the new resolution authority with little input from those who 
understand chapter 11 in particular.96 
The risks that remain, even if existing procedures are used to nar-
row the gap among resolution procedures, stem from the simple fact that 
there still remains differences among systems, and the degree of those 
differences is often hard to evaluate ex ante. 
For example, the new resolution process provides for a kind of 
“best interest of creditors” test like that found in chapter 11, which re-
quires that creditors receive at least as much as they would have in a 
chapter 7 liquidation.97 But the Dodd-Frank version of the test provides 
no right to test the valuation of the debtor in court and no apparent right 
to appeal the FDIC’s determination in any respect.98 Thus, in chapter 11, 
the test will be founded on the testimony of the debtor’s valuation expert 
subject to cross-examination and competing valuation evidence. In the 
resolution authority, the FDIC will conduct the analysis without any ob-
ligation to disclose its methods or subject them to examination. From an 
ex ante perspective, an unsecured creditor can have no faith that these 
two procedures will result in the same recovery for creditors. 
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And one drawback of reducing the use of Dodd-Frank’s resolution 
authority is that it will increase the uncertainty of how that system will 
play out when finally invoked. And there is no way to prevent use of the 
resolution authority in some number of extreme cases. In short, the li-
mited number of Dodd-Frank resolution cases will make it harder to 
price the effects of the resolution authority. 
In short, the differences between the various insolvency systems 
and creditors’ rights thereunder will continue to be a source of uncertain-
ty and thus systemic risk. And while the FDIC and other regulatory au-
thorities can attempt to minimize the gaps between the two systems, the 
inherent difference between an FDIC receivership, where the FDIC acts 
as both liquidator and bankruptcy court, and the more typical, court-
centered bankruptcy process, with much greater rights of due process, 
means that the financial markets will have to come to grips with the new, 
flawed reality of the post-Dodd-Frank world. 
On the other hand, I should be clear that the problems I identify do 
not inevitably point to the need to have chapter 11 dominate this entire 
field. Instead, I ultimately conclude that the missed opportunity of Dodd-
Frank was the failure to come up with a single forum for resolving finan-
cial distress in financial institutions. That forum might be chapter 11, but 
it might also be the resolution authority. Each has its drawbacks, but 
Congress should have had the courage to pick one. 
